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A model with leisure production and endogenous retirement is used to explain the declining
labor force participation rates of elderly males. The model is calibrated to cross-sectional data
on the labor force participation rates of elderly US males by age, their median drop in market
consumption and leisure good expenditure share in the year 2000. Running the calibrated model
for the period 1850 to 2000, a prediction of the evolution of the cross-section is obtained. The
model is able to predict more than 87 percent of the increase in retirement of men over 65. The
increase in retirement is driven by rising real wages and a falling price of leisure goods over time.
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Senior citizens in the U.S. today spend their time gardening, travelling, and enjoying a wide range
of entertainment goods. Less than 20 percent are in the workforce. Instead they allocate their
time among various leisure and home activities. The U.S. was quite a di®erent place in 1880,
when more than 75 percent of men over the age of 65 were participating in the labor market.
Labor force participation rates of men aged 65 and over have been continually declining since the
latter half of the nineteenth century. Concurrently, life expectancies have risen resulting in an
increase in the fraction of a man's life spent in retirement.
Retired men spend the majority of their time engaged in leisure activities. Thus, the story
of retirement is a story of leisure. Leisure activities, like most activities, require the use of both
time and goods. Becker provides examples of such activities in his 1965 paper, one of which is
\the seeing of a play, which depends on the input of actors, script, theatre and the playgoer's
time."2 Another example is riding a bike which requires both time and a bike.
The quality-adjusted relative price of leisure goods has been declining since the nineteenth
century. Over the same time period, real wage rates have been rising. The argument put forth
here is that together declining leisure good prices and rising wages have made the leisure-intensive
retirement lifestyle more a®ordable, driving a rise in retirement. The objective of the paper is to
quantify the contributions of the rise in real wages and the fall in the prices of leisure goods to
the decrease in the labor force participation rates of elderly U.S. males throughout the twentieth
century.
To achieve this goal, a continuous-time model in which agents choose the moment of their
retirement is developed. In the spirit of Becker (1965), agents in the model economy produce
leisure by combining leisure time with leisure goods. When working, agents are assumed to
work full-time and allocate remaining time to leisure production. Once retired agents allocate
all their time to leisure production. Agents require a minimum level of market consumption for
survival and derive utility from a non-separable function of leisure and consumption of market
goods beyond subsistence level. The model is designed to be consistent with three important
characteristics of the retirement period: (i.) upon retiring men signi¯cantly increase their time
2 Becker (1965), p. 495.
1spent on leisure activities; (ii.) for the majority of workers, retirement is a complete withdrawal
from the labor force; and (iii.) for many individuals market consumption changes discretely at
the moment of retirement.
The model permits leisure goods and leisure time to be either (Hicksian) substitutes or com-
plements in leisure production. It is shown that when the two inputs are complements a fall in the
price of leisure goods relative to leisure time will generate an increased demand for leisure time,
lowering the optimal retirement age. In addition, it is shown that when leisure goods and leisure
time are complements, the income e®ect of an increase in real wages dominates the substitution
e®ect. Consequently, higher wages also lower the optimal retirement age. On the other hand,
under substitutability between leisure time and leisure goods, a decrease in leisure good prices
generates a rise in the optimal retirement age whereas an increase in wages has an ambiguous
e®ect. The degree of complementarity between leisure goods and leisure time will not be assumed
but determined by the calibration. Hence the calibration will determine both the overall and the
relative importance of falling leisure good prices and rising wages for the increase in retirement
observed in the data.
The model economy consists of overlapping generations of agents. In order to generate vari-
ation in the age of retirement within a generation, agents di®er by education type and within
education types they vary by initial market productivity level. Each agent has a hump-shaped
market productivity pro¯le which depends upon his birth year, education type and initial market
productivity level and an age-speci¯c survival function that depends upon his birth year. In
addition, agents vary in their ability to produce leisure or leisure productivity which is constant
over their lifetime and uncorrelated with their market productivity pro¯le. Agents with higher
education levels on average have higher levels of market productivity and pro¯les that peak later
in life.
The e®ect of an increase in an agent's overall level of market productivity is equivalent to the
e®ect of an increase in wages. Therefore, everything else identical, agents with higher overall levels
of market productivity will choose to retire earlier than those with lower ones whenever the income
e®ect of an increase in wages dominates the substitution e®ect. The later peak in the higher types'
pro¯les however will increase the marginal cost of retiring at a given age relative to the cost for
an agent with an earlier peaking pro¯le. This is because the level of earnings that the agent
2foregoes to retire is higher. Consequently while variation in education types and productivity
levels within types will generate variation in retirement ages, the relationship between education
type, initial market productivity, and retirement age will depend on the calibration.
Everything else identical, agents with higher leisure productivity will retire later than those
with lower leisure productivity when leisure time and leisure goods are complements and vice
versa when they are substitutes. When leisure time and leisure goods are complements agents
with higher leisure productivity demand more leisure goods at each moment of their life. Thus it is
optimal for them to delay retirement in order to increase their lifetime earnings and, consequently,
their expenditure on leisure goods. When leisure time and leisure goods are substitutes it is the
lower productivity agents that have a higher demand for leisure goods and therefore choose to
retire relatively later.
The model is calibrated to the year 2000 using cross-sectional data from the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). The calibration is done by minimizing the distance between the model
and data along eight key moments: the labor force participation rates of six age groups, the
median drop in consumption at retirement, and leisure goods' expenditure share. Then the
model is used to compute the labor force participation rates of the six age groups over the 1850
to 2000 period by plugging in the rate of decrease of leisure good prices and the rate of increase
of wages along with the changes in agents survival pro¯les, life expectancies, and education levels
over this period.
The model is able to match the year 2000 distribution of elderly labor force participation rates
by age group and generates a consumption drop at retirement and leisure good expenditure share
in 2000 that are in line with the data. Under the baseline calibration, leisure time and leisure
goods are complements and thus the fall in the relative price of leisure goods and the rise in wages
over the 1850 to 2000 period have a positive impact on retirement. An increase in the fraction
of agents with high school and college educations also positively impacts retirement. However,
the e®ect of rising education is small. Finally, under the assumption that agents can fully insure
against survival risk, rising life expectancies in the model have a negative impact on retirement.
According to the model, taking into account the observed changes in survival pro¯les, life
expectancies and education levels since the eighteenth century, the rising wage rate and falling
3prices of leisure goods explain more than 87 percent of the rise in retirement of males aged 65
and over. The model also reveals that these driving forces had a large impact on the retirement
behavior of men aged 55 to 64. A series of counterfactual experiments show that the rise in real
wages was the dominant force decreasing labor force participation rates. However, the decrease
in the price of leisure goods since the eighteenth century has also played a signi¯cant role, alone
generating approximately 13 percent of the increase in retirement of the elderly ages 65 to 69.
This paper is a ¯rst attempt at accounting for the long-run rise in retirement using a quan-
titative macroeconomic approach. Similar arguments on the impact of leisure goods' prices on
labor-supply have been made to understand changes in labor-supply on the intensive margin by
Owen (1971) and more recently by Vandenbroucke (2009) and Gonz¶ alez Chapela (2007). The
argument that a fall in the price of leisure goods may be an important driver of the long-run
rise in retirement was ¯rst made by Costa (1998). The most common alternative theory of rising
retirement is that it was driven by the increase in social insurance programs and private pensions.
However, ¯ndings from empirical studies on the ability of such programs to account for the rise
are mixed.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents some facts on retirement and leisure. Section
3 presents the model. The quantitative experiment is presented in Section 4, which includes of
explanation of the calibration procedure and presents the model's prediction for the trend in
retirement since 1850. The section concludes with the presentation of a series of counterfactual
experiments and a discussion of the contribution of the various driving forces to the retirement
trend. Section 5 discusses related literature and Section 6 concludes.
2 Retirement
Retirement is de¯ned as a planned, complete, and usually permanent withdrawal from the labor
force by older workers. In this section, data illustrating the trends in retirement in the U.S. and
other countries is presented. The section then provides a discussion of some important charac-
teristics of the retirement period that are used as guidelines for making modeling assumptions.















































Figure 1: Labor force participation rates of men aged 65 and over for the period 1850 to 1990
in the United States, France, Great Britain, and Germany and men aged 55 to 64 in the United
States.
2.1 Historical Trends
A trend of rising retirement since the nineteenth century is not unique to the United States.
Figure 1 shows the labor force participation rates of men aged 65 and over for the period 1850 to
1990 in the U.S., France, Great Britain, and Germany, and the participation rates of men aged 55
to 64 in the U.S. Notice that the decline in the labor force participation rates occurred in all four
countries. This decline cannot be accounted for by the change in the composition of the elderly
population due to the increase in life expectancy. Participation rates fell for all ages above 65.
In addition, participation rates have fallen among men aged 55 to 64. In 1880, 96 percent of men
aged 60 to 64 were in the labor force, by 1990 only 39 percent were. For men in their late ¯fties,
participation rates have been declining since 1900 but started to decline at a faster rate around
1960.3
Labor force participation rates have also been declining in developing countries. For example,
the labor force participation rate of men aged 65 and over fell from 67 percent to 52 percent in
Mexico between 1970 and 1999. In Peru it fell from 62 percent to 41 percent and in Turkey from
3 See Costa (1998), Chapter 2 for a in-depth discussion of trends in labor force participation. The source for
Figure 1 is Costa (1998), p. 29, Tables 2A.1 and 2A.2.

























































































Figure 2: Retirement rates for men aged 50 and over by age group and the expected percentage
of life spent in retirement at the age of 20 for the period 1850 to 2000 in the United States.
68 percent to 34 percent over the same period. Unfortunately data from these countries is only
available for recent years.4
To obtain a direct measure of the increase in retirement a statistic called the retirement rate
is calculated using data from IPUMS for men aged 50 and over for the period 1850 to 2000. The
retirement rate is the ratio of the number of men who are retired to the number of men either
in the labor force or retired. In order to be classed as retired a man must be completely out of
the labor force. Hence men who are working part-time or part-year are counted as working and
not retired. The retirement rates are presented in the left-hand graph of Figure 2 for men by
¯ve-year-age groups.5 Notice that the retirement rates of the youngest age group, those aged 50
to 54, don't increase over time while the rates of all the other age groups do increase. For the
oldest age group, those aged 75 to 79, the retirement rate rises from about 20 percent in 1850 to
nearly 90 percent in 2000.
The combination of rising life expectancies and declining labor force participation rates of the
elderly has led to an increase in the expected duration of retirement. In fact, a twenty-year-old
4 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Series P95/01-1, An Aging World: 2001 (2001).
5 The data for the retirement rates is from: Ruggles, Steven, et al. 2004. Integrated Public Use Micro-
data Series: Version 3.0. (IPUMS) Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center. It can be found
at http://www.ipums.org. The retirement rates for each age group were computed by observing that:
% retired = (% not in the labor force ¡ % never participating)=(1 ¡ % never participating).
6male in 1850 would have expected to spend approximately 6 percent of his adult life retired,
while a male who was twenty in 1990 can expect to spend 30 percent of adult life retired. The
right-hand graph in Figure 2 shows how the expected percentage of adult life spent in retirement
has risen over this period.6
2.2 Characteristics of the Retirement Period
In order to study the impact of changing prices on the retirement behavior of men a model of
retirement must be consistent with the de¯ning characteristics of the retirement period. Three
important characteristics are discussed below along with an explanation of how the baseline model
is designed to be in accordance with them.
2.2.1 Increase in Leisure
The retirement period is a period in which one must reallocate his time from market to non-
market activities. Thus to gain insight into the retirement decision it is important to investigate
how retired people spend their time. Table 1 gives a breakdown of men's time-use by age.7 Notice
that older men allocate more of their time to leisure and home activities. In particular, men age
55 to 64 spend approximately 19 percent more time on recreation than men aged 25 to 54, while
men age 65 and over spend nearly 43 percent more time. Thus retirement is a period when men's
time spent on leisure activities signi¯cantly increases. Consistent with this fact, retired men
spend more time using leisure goods, such as televisions, radios, stereos, books, magazines, and
newspapers. For example, according to Godbey and Robinson (1997), in 1985, men aged 55 to 64
spent 13 percent more time watching television than men aged 25 to 54, while men over the age
of 64 spent 81 percent more time. Men over the age of 64 also spent nearly double the amount of
time men aged 25 to 54 spent reading and listening to music. Table 2 gives a breakdown of time
spent in various leisure activities by age groups for men in 1985.8 In addition to spending more
time with leisure goods, there is evidence that upon retirement, individuals increase the share of
6 Adult life excludes the ¯rst twenty years. The data for the expected portion of life in retirement in Figure 2 is
taken from Lee (2001), Table 1, p. 645. It is based on the same IPUMS data as used to compute the retirement
rates. The expected length of retirement is computed assuming 20 year-olds have perfect information about
future mortality rates.
7 Source for Table 1 is Godbey and Robinson (1997), p. 207, Table 19.
8 The source for Table 2 is the same as that for Table 1. See footnote 7.




Sleeping 54.9 57.5 58.7
Working or commuting 40.1 23.7 8.0
Recreation 35.8 42.7 51.1
Grooming and child care 10.9 10.2 12.3
Eating and preparing meals 9.5 12 12.6
House and Yard Work 9.2 13.5 16.7
Shopping 4.7 5.4 5.6
Other 2.1 2 2.4




Participating in organizations 0.9 2.2 1.1
Attending events 0.9 0.6 0.1
Visiting 6.6 6.7 6.0
Playing or watching sports 2.9 2.8 3.0
Hobbies 2.5 3.5 3.5
Talking or socializing 2.8 3.1 4.5
Watching TV 16.1 18.2 24.9
Reading 2.6 4.7 6.7
Listening to music 0.5 0.9 1.3
their expenditure that they allocate to leisure goods. Weagley and Huh (2004) ¯nd, using data
from the 1995 Consumer Expenditure Survey, that controlling for age, education, income, and
demographics, leisure goods' share of total expenditure increases at retirement.
How have leisure good prices changed over time? The left-hand side of Figure 3 presents the
price index for a particular selection of leisure goods relative to the CPI over the period 1900
to 2000. The price of these leisure goods has fallen at an average annual rate of approximately
1 percent.9 The price index is based on the set of leisure goods whose expenditure shares are
9 Sources for the price index: For the period 1901 to 1934, data from Owen (1969), Table 4-B, p. 85 is used; for
the period 1935 to 1968, data is from the Historical Statistics Series E 165; and for 1969 - 2001, the data is
taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Handbooks of U.S. Labor Statistics, 2nd. Ed. (1998), p. 263 and
6th Ed. (2003), p. 308.



































































Figure 3: Relative price index of leisure goods and breakdown of their share of total expenditure
in the United States for the period 1900 to 2001.
provided in the graph on the right-hand side.10 In 1900 the average American allocated approxi-
mately 3 percent of his expenditure to leisure goods. By 2001 this fraction had increased to over
8 percent. Notice that this set of leisure good does not include transportation goods or services.
Yet approximately 30 percent of the average total miles driven with a car each year are driven
for social and recreational trips.11 When 30 percent of expenditure on transportation is included
in leisure good expenditure, leisure goods' expenditure share rises from about 4 percent in 1900
to nearly 12 percent in 2001.
To capture the e®ect of men's reallocation of time from market activities to leisure activities
upon retirement, it is assumed that men engage in leisure production. The notion of leisure
production is inspired by Becker's 1965 paper and is similar to home production. There is an
extensive literature demonstrating the importance of home production in explaining a variety of
phenomena.12 The key di®erence between home and leisure production is the following. Time
spent on housework and household durables are usually found to be substitutes in production of
the home good. Thus a fall in the price of household durables decreases the demand for time
10 The source for the expenditure shares is Lebergott (1996).
11 Based on data from a selection of years between 1951 and 1995. Source: 1951-58: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Public Roads. 1969-1995: Federal Highway Administration, National Personal Transportation Survey,
Summary of Travel Trends.
12 For examples see Reid (1934), Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991), Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke
(2005), R¶ ³os-Rull (1993) and the references therein.
9spent on housework. In contrast, time spent on leisure activities and leisure goods are argued
here to be complements in the production of leisure. Under this assumption, a fall in the price
of leisure goods leads to an increased demand for leisure time.
2.2.2 Labor Force Withdrawal
For the majority of workers retirement involves a complete withdrawal from the labor force
or, in other words, switching from full-time work to being fully retired. A variety of theories
have been proposed to explain why a majority of older workers withdraw once and completely
from the labor market. They include the inability of older workers, in demanding jobs, to handle
physical and/or mental stress, minimum hours constraints and schedule in°exibility, and employer
incentives and pensions. Evidence from the HRS has pointed to minimum hours constraints and
schedule in°exibility as the largest factors in°uencing retirement decisions. For example, Hurd
and McGarry (1993) ¯nd, using the HRS, that the ability to change hours of work, pensions,
and health insurance have an important e®ect on retirement decisions. While Gustman and
Steinmeier (2004) conclude, based on the HRS, that relaxing minimum hours constraints would
signi¯cantly increase the percentage of older people who continue working. Given these ¯ndings,
it is assumed that agents in the model start o® their lives as workers and are unable to adjust
labor supply on the intensive margin. Consequently, agents in the model are either working
full-time or retired.
2.2.3 Drop in Market Consumption
Numerous studies based on a variety of di®erent datasets have found evidence of a signi¯cant drop
in consumption at the moment of retirement. The causes of this drop are not well understood and
thus is has come to be known as the retirement-consumption puzzle. In contrast to these studies,
in a recent work, Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) ¯nd an average consumption drop for individuals
of 4.7 percent of pre-retirement expenditure and a median drop of 5.9 percent. Their estimates
are based on data from the HRS and three waves of a supplemental survey called CAMS. Their
analysis is unique in that it is the ¯rst study of the consumption drop at retirement for U.S.
households that is based on observations of total expenditure before and after retirement by the
10same individuals. The ¯ndings are in contrast to those of earlier works that used synthetic panels
and/or partial measures of consumption and estimated the average drop in market expenditure
to be in the range of 10 to 30 percent of pre-retirement expenditure.13 Exploring the distribution
of the expenditure drop across individuals, Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) ¯nd that estimates based
on synthetic cohorts are likely to have been driven by a few individuals having large declines.
They also ¯nd a great deal of variation in expenditure changes at retirement across the population
with some individuals experiencing signi¯cant increases and others signi¯cant decreases.
One possible explanation for the discrete changes in expenditure at retirement observed in the
data is that they are driven by complementarity or substitutability in utility between non-market
time and various market goods. Supporting this view, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) ¯nd that while
expenditure on food declines at retirement, calorie and vitamin consumption does not, suggesting
that retirees substitute non-market time for expenditure on food. The ¯ndings of Weagley and
Huh (2004) that leisure goods expenditures increase at retirement support the notion that leisure
goods and non-market time are complements in utility.
Complementarity (or substitutability) in utility, also known as Edgeworth-Pareto complemen-
tarity, is di®erent from Hicksian complementarity. Two items are complements (substitutes) in
utility if an increase in the amount of one item, increases (decreases) the marginal utility of the
other. Whereas, two items are Hicksian complements (substitutes) if a decrease in the price of
one increases (decrease) demand for the other. For two items to be Edgeworth-Pareto comple-
ments or substitutes they must be nonseparable in utility such that their marginal utilities are
functions of the level of the other item. When this is the case, it is optimal to discretely adjust
the level of one item in response to a discrete jump in the level of the other in order to smooth
utility. Whether two goods are complements or substitutes in utility depends upon the elasticity
of substitution between the two items and the concavity of the utility function.
In the model economy total expenditure consists of expenditure on leisure goods and a general
consumption good. Agents are assumed to produce leisure by combining leisure time with leisure
13 For example, Hurd and Rohwedder (2005) ¯nd, using data from the 2001 CAMS supplemental survey of 2000
HRS respondents that expenditure on market non-durables drops by 16.8 percent for singles and 11.6 percent
for married couples at the moment of retirement of the household head, Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001)
¯nd an average drop in expenditure on food of 14 percent using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
and Aguiar and Hurst (2005) ¯nd an average drop in expenditures on food of 17 percent using data from the
Continuing Survey of Food Intakes conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
11goods and the production function is such that leisure time and leisure goods can be either
Hicksian substitutes or complements with one another. In this framework the marginal utility of
leisure time will depend on the quantity of leisure goods and vice versa. When agents retire their
leisure time jumps up generating a discrete jump in their leisure good consumption. If utility
is separable in market consumption and leisure, then the jump in leisure good consumption will
drive the change in total consumption at the moment of retirement. However, as mentioned
above, leisure good expenditure increases at retirement. In order to give the model the chance to
be consistent with this fact and match the drop in total expenditure observed in the data, market
consumption and leisure are assumed to be non-separable in utility.
3 The Model
Time is continuous and indexed by t. The economy consists of overlapping generations. Agents
are characterized by their type s ´ (¿;e;x0;z), where ¿ denotes the date of the agent's birth. An
agent born at moment ¿ will be age a = t ¡ ¿ at time t. The parameter e denotes the agent's
level of education and x0 is the agent's initial market productivity level. Together ¿, e, and x0
determine the agent's lifetime market productivity pro¯le xs(¢). The parameter z is the agent's
ability to produce leisure and is constant over the agent's lifetime.
Within each generation there is a distribution of agents across education levels and for each
education level there is a distribution of agents across initial market productivity levels. Let
F¿(e) denote the distribution of generation-¿ agents across education levels and Ge(x0) denote
the distribution of agents of education level e across initial productivity levels. Each agent's
leisure productivity, z, is drawn from the distribution H(z) which is independent of the agent's
age-cohort, education level, and initial market productivity. In addition, there is no correlation
between an agent's market ability pro¯le and his leisure ability.
Agents live for a maximum length of time T. At ages below T an agent's survival is determined
by a generation-speci¯c survival function q¿(a). In other words, q¿(a) is the probability that a
member of the generation-¿ cohort survives to at least age a.
The economy contains two types of goods: market (or general consumption) goods and goods
which aid in leisure production, here called leisure goods. The price of market goods at each date
12t is normalized to one. The price of leisure goods relative to market goods at date t is denoted
by pg(t).
3.1 Agents' Maximization Problem
Agents have one unit of time at each moment of their lives. Newly-born agents of type s start
o® their lives as workers, inelastically supplying a fraction ¹ h of their time to the market and
receiving earnings w(¿ + a)¹ hxs(a). The function w(¿ + a) is the wage per an e±ciency unit of
labor at time ¿ + a and xs(a) is the agents' market productivity at age a. Market productivity
pro¯les are humped-shaped over the life-cycle.
Time that is not spent working on the market is dedicated to the production of leisure which
requires both time and leisure goods. At each age a, each agent combines leisure with market
goods to generate utility. In addition to choosing the stream of market goods, cs(a), and the
stream of leisure goods, gs(a), that he purchases over his lifetime, a type-s agent chooses an age
at which to permanently retire from market work, As. Once retired agents spend all their time





1 ¡ ¹ h; a · As;
1; a > As:
(3.1)
Leisure time and leisure goods are combined to produce leisure using the constant elasticity of
substitution production function
ns(a) = f³gs(a)Â + (1 ¡ ³)[zls(a)]Âg
1
Â ;
where 0 · ³ · 1, Â · 1 and Â = 0 implies a Cobb-Douglas production function. The parameter
³ is the weight on leisure inputs relative to leisure time in the production function. Under this
formulation the elasticity of substitution between leisure time and leisure goods is 1=(1 ¡ Â).
An agent born at date ¿ with education level e, initial market productivity x0 and leisure
productivity z chooses paths of market good and leisure good purchases over his lifetime, cs(a)








subject to his lifetime budget constraint and A · T. The parameter µ captures the subjective
time-discounting rate and the cohort-dependent survival function, q¿(a) is log-sextic in age. The
momentary utility function is of the constant relative risk aversion form so
U[cs(a);ns(a)] =
©




where ^ c ¸ 0, 0 · ® · 1, ¾ > 0 and ¾ = 1 implies log-utility. The parameter ® determines the
importance of market goods relative to leisure for utility and the parameter ^ c is a subsistence
level of market good consumption. The objective function is expressed as the sum of the agent's
utility while working and his utility while retired. This is done to highlight the role that the age
at which the agent retires, a choice variable, plays in his decision problem. It is also written in
this way because, as is described below, time spent on leisure is not continuous at the moment of
retirement. In general, the discontinuity in leisure time at retirement will result in a discontinuity
in the momentary utility function at retirement.
As in Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000), the economy contains a life-insurance company
which o®ers actuarially-fair annuities to the agents. Annuities allow agents to share mortality risk
and, as was ¯rst shown by Yaari (1965), since the agents have no bequest motive or precautionary
savings motive they will use annuities as their sole instrument of investment. The rate of return
on an annuity for an agent with death hazard rate h¿(a) = ¡dlnq¿(a)=da is equal to r, the






0 e¡raq¿(a)pg(a + ¿)gs(a)da+
R T
As e¡raq¿(a)pg(a + ¿)gs(a)da =
R As
0 e¡raq¿(a)xs(a)¹ hw(a + ¿)da:
(3.4)
Hereafter the s-subscript is dropped for ease of notations.
The ¯rst-order condition for market consumption is
®e¡µa[c(a) ¡ ^ c](1¡¾)®¡1n(a)(1¡¾)(1¡®) = ¸e¡ra; 8a 2 [0;T]; (3.5)
14where ¸ is the multiplier on (3.4) in the Lagrangian. The ¯rst-order condition for purchase of
the leisure good is
(1 ¡ ®)³e¡µa[c(a) ¡ ^ c](1¡¾)®n(a)(1¡¾)(1¡®)¡Âg(a)Â¡1 =
¸e¡rapg(a + ¿); 8a 2 [0;T]:
(3.6)
Notice that time spent on leisure enters the ¯rst-order conditions for market consumption and
leisure goods. This occurs because market consumption and leisure time are non-separable in
utility as are leisure goods and leisure time. Hence leisure time a®ects the marginal utility
of market consumption and leisure goods. Agents want to smooth marginal utility over their
lifetime. However, at the moment of retirement their marginal utility jumps discretely due to the
discrete jump in their leisure time. In order to smooth marginal utility, the agents make discrete
adjustments to their consumption and leisure goods at this moment. The ¯rst-order condition
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where cA is market consumption at the moment of retirement, given that the agent is still working,
or
cA = c(A); (3.8)
cA is de¯ned as
cA = lim
a!A+ c(a); (3.9)
and nA, nA, gA, and g
A, are de¯ned similarly. To understand equation (3.7), consider the
problem of an agent who is deciding whether or not he should retire at age A. If he retires, his
instantaneous utility changes. His net gain in utility is on the left-hand side of equation (3.7).
This is the marginal cost of postponing retirement. The right-hand side is the marginal bene¯t.
It is the utility value of the savings of the agent at age A if he is working net of his savings at A if
he is retired. As long as the marginal bene¯t of working exceeds the marginal cost, the agent will
not retire. Thus an agent could die having never retired. At an interior solution for the optimal
retirement date, A, equation (3.7) will hold with equality.
15Solving (3.5) for c(a) and di®erentiating with respect to a gives
_ c(a)
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The stream of market goods and leisure goods that agents purchase over the lifetime must satisfy
the di®erential equations given by equations (3.10) and (3.11).
Under what conditions will falling prices of leisure goods and rising wages generate an increase
in retirement? First consider the e®ect of a fall in the price of leisure goods. The lower price will
lead to an increase in retirement when Â < 0. In this case leisure time and leisure goods will be
complements and a decrease in the price of leisure goods will generate an increased demand for
leisure time. Leisure time, however, can only be increased by retiring earlier. Thus agents will
choose to exit the labor force at a younger age. In the opposite case, Â > 0, leisure goods and
leisure time are substitutes and a decrease in the price of leisure goods will delay retirement.
Now consider the impact on retirement of an increase in wages. The impact can be decomposed
into two e®ects. The ¯rst e®ect is due to the fact that, when the wage rate increases, the price of
leisure goods relative to leisure time falls. This has the same e®ect on retirement as a fall in the
price of leisure goods: If Â < 0 then it will lower the retirement age and if Â > 0 it will raise the
retirement age. The second e®ect is due to the fact that the price of market consumption relative
to leisure time falls. As long as ^ c > 0 market goods and leisure time will be complements and the
fall in this price will lower the retirement age. If ^ c = 0 then the retirement age is independent
of the relative price. Hence, overall, an increase in wages will lead to an increase in retirement
if Â · 0. However, when Â > 0 the two e®ects work in opposite directions and, depending on
16which e®ect dominates, retirement will either decrease or increase. These results are formalized
in the following two propositions. Formal proofs are provided in the Appendix for the case where
¾ = 1. Although not proven here, the results hold for the general case of ¾ > 0. In the numerical
exercise that follows whether Â is positive or negative will be determined by the calibration.
Proposition 1 Let the path of leisure good prices over the agent's lifetime be pg(a + ¿) =
pg;¿ ~ pg(a + ¿). Then, at an interior solution, the retirement age A is
i. independent of pg;¿ if Â = 0,
ii. increasing in pg;¿ if leisure goods and leisure time are complements (Â < 0),
iii. decreasing in pg;¿ if leisure goods and leisure time are substitutes (Â > 0).
Proof. See the Appendix for the proof when ¾ = 1.
Proposition 2 Let the path of wages over the the agent's lifetime be w(a + ¿) = w¿ ~ w(a + ¿).
Then, at an interior solution with Â · 0, the retirement age A is decreasing in w¿.
Proof. See the Appendix for the proof when ¾ = 1.
Variation in market productivity pro¯les and leisure productivity will generate a variation in
retirement rates within generations. An agent's retirement age will depend upon both the level
and the shape of his productivity pro¯le. Notice that the e®ect on retirement age of a higher
level of market productivity, holding the shape of the pro¯le ¯xed, is equivalent to the e®ect of
an upward shift in an agent's lifetime wage pro¯le. Thus, holding the shape ¯xed, agents with
higher levels of market productivity will retire later when Â is negative, however the impact is
ambiguous when Â is positive. This result is formalized in the following corollary to Proposition
2.
Corollary 3 All else the same, at an interior solution with Â · 0, an upward level shift in an
agent's productivity pro¯le will lead to a decrease in his retirement age A.
Proof. Assume that w¿ in Proposition 2 is the shift in the agent's productivity pro¯le instead
of in his wage pro¯le.
17In the numerical experiment that follows higher market productivity agents will have produc-
tivity pro¯les that peak later in their lifetime and reach a higher overall level relative to their
initial productivity. A later peaking pro¯le will increase the optimal age of retirement. This is
because, initial productivity the same, the foregone income and thus the marginal cost of retir-
ing at an age later in life for an agent with a later peaking pro¯le is higher. Whether a higher
productivity type retires earlier or later then a lower type will depend on whether the e®ect of
the level or the shape of the pro¯le dominates.
A higher level of leisure productivity has the opposite e®ect on retirement when Â is negative.
In this case, complementarity between leisure goods and leisure time increases the lifetime demand
for leisure goods. Thus it is optimal for agents with relatively higher leisure productivity to work
for more years to ¯nance a higher level of leisure good expenditure. On the other hand, when
Â < 0, leisure time is a substitute for leisure goods and it is the agents with relatively less leisure
productivity who have a higher lifetime demand for leisure goods and, consequently, choose to
retire later. This result is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 At an interior solution the retirement age A is
i. independent of z if Â = 0,
ii. increasing in z if leisure goods and leisure time are complements (Â < 0),
iii. decreasing in z if leisure goods and leisure time are substitutes (Â > 0).
Proof. See the Appendix for the proof when ¾ = 1.
For the numerical analysis, it is assumed that wages grow at the constant rate · over time
such that w(t) = w(0)e·t; and the price of the leisure goods is assumed to decrease over time at
rate ° such that pg(t) = pg(0)e¡°t: Since the models purpose is to generate the long-run trend in
retirement these assumptions seem reasonable and greatly simplify the numerical analysis.
4 Numerical Analysis
The following experiment is devised to bring the model to the data: First the model is calibrated
to the year 2000 by matching data on the cross-sectional distribution of labor force participation
18rates, the drop in market consumption at the moment of retirement, and the average expenditure
share on leisure goods in 2000. Then the rates of change of wages and leisure good prices,
cohort-speci¯c survival functions, productivity pro¯les and distributions over education levels,
also chosen to be consistent with the data, are plugged into the model. Finally the calibrated
model is used to reproduce the evolution of the cross-section of the elderly population, aged 50
to 80, for the period 1850 to 2000.
4.1 Computation
In order to ease the computation of the statistics of interest, the model and statistics are computed
for a discrete set of types. Each agent is characterized by his birth year, ¿, his education level, e,
his initial market productivity, x0, and his leisure productivity, z. To discretize ¿, it is assumed
that agents are born at ¯ve year intervals. Education level is discretized by assuming each agent
belongs to one of three possible groups: G, H and C { corresponding to grammar school (8 years
of education or less), high school (9 to 12 years of education) and college (13 years of education
or more), respectively.
The set of discrete values for x0 is determined as follows. First, assume that initial productivity
level conditional on being in education group e, xe
0, can take one of 10 possible values. Let X e
denote the set of such values. Second, assume that for each education group e, the distribution
of xe
0 approximates a truncated lognormal distribution. The truncation points are set so that 0.5
percent of the area underlying the original distribution is removed from each side. Thus ln(xe
0)
is distributed truncated normal with mean ¹e
x0, and standard deviation ¾e
x0. Then, assume that,
for each education group, X e is an evenly-spaced in logarithms grid over the domain of education
group e's distribution. Finally the set of all possible values of x0 is given by X =
S
e2fG;H;C] Xe
and the distribution over X for education group e, Ge(x0), is such that it approximates the
truncated lognormal with corresponding mean and variance over X e and places 0 weight on
values outside of X e.
Finally, the discrete set for z, denoted Z, is assumed to consist of 20 values. Similarly to xe
0,
assume that ln(z) is approximately truncated normal with mean ¹z and standard deviation ¾z.
Let Z be an evenly-spaced grid in logarithms set such that 0.5 percent of the area underlying the
19original lognormal distribution is removed from each side and H(z) be the corresponding weights
that approximate the lognormal distribution.
Given an agent's type s and the series for prices and wages, the agent's maximization problem
is solved numerically by a combination of a grid search over the retirement date, A, and a more
e±cient gradient-based root-¯nding algorithm. Care is taken to ensure that a potential solution
is the global maximizer by checking the second-order conditions and corners. A more detailed
description of the algorithm used to compute the solution to the agent's maximization problem
can be found in the Appendix.
4.2 Calibration
Since agents are born at 5 year intervals, at any moment in time the population of people aged
50 to 79 is represented by six cohorts ages 52, 57, and so on up to 77. Speci¯cally, 52 year-olds
in the model represent 50 to 54 year-olds in data and so on. Agents are born as twenty year-old
adults. Therefore time begins in 1793 since the oldest cohort in the economy, i.e., the one who is
age 77 in 1850, must be born 57 years earlier.
The wage rate in 1793 is normalized to 1. The baseline calibration then proceeds in two stages.
In the ¯rst stage parameters that can be determined from the data without computing the model
are assigned. Then in the second stage, termed \estimation", the remaining parameters are chosen
to minimize the di®erence between moments from the model and the data. The \estimation"
done here is similar to generalized methods of moments estimation but without optimal weighting
or computation of standard errors.
4.2.1 A Priori
Survival Functions and Life Expectancies Each cohort's survival function gives the prob-
ability of surviving from model age 0 (age 20 in the data) to model age a (age a+20 in the data).























































Figure 4: Expectations of life for 20 year-old males for the period 1790 to 2000.
The coe±cients are estimated from data on survivorship at age 20 for men born after 1850.
Age-speci¯c survivorship data is taken from Haines (1994) for the period 1850 to 1900 and
the National Vital Statistics Report for the period 1900 to 2000.14 Survivorship tables are not
available for the 1790 to 1850 period. Hence the survival functions are approximated using data
on life expectancies based on family histories taken from Pope (1992).15
The life expectancies of twenty-year-old males that the model is matched to are given in Figure
4. The data shows that the life expectancy of a twenty-year-old male in 1790 was similar to that of
a twenty-year-old male in 1850 and life expectancies fell dramatically for U.S. males (surprisingly
also for females) during the antebellum period. In addition, it wasn't until the twentieth century
that mortality conditions in the U.S. began to consistently improve. The data is top-cut at age
100 hence it is assumed that agents live to a maximum age of 80 in the model, i.e. T = 80 for
all cohorts. The survival functions of the 1793 cohort, the 1873 cohort and the 1968 cohort are
given in Figure 5. The signi¯cant reduction in the probability of death at younger ages for the
1968 cohort versus both the 1793 cohort and the 1873 cohort is captured by the rounding out of
the survival functions.
14 The exact source for the 1900 to 2000 period is the \United States Life Tables, 2001" in National Vital Statistics
Reports, Vol. 52, No. 14 (2004).
15 Speci¯cally, for each decade from 1790 to 1840 the survival function is determined by shifting the 1850 survival
function to match the decade-speci¯c life expectancy, i.e., for lack of a better assumption, the survival functions
for cohorts born between 1790 and 1850 are assumed to have the same shape as the 1850 survival function.







































Figure 5: Survival functions of the 1973 cohort, 1848 cohort, and 1968 cohort.
Education Distributions The cohort-speci¯c distributions of agents across education groups,
F¿(e), are calibrated using U.S. Census data on years of school completed by age for males. Since
the data is only available every 10 years starting in 1940, the distributions are set as follows. For
the 1923 through 1998 cohorts, each distribution is chosen to match that cohort's corresponding
distribution when it is either 30 to 34 years of age or 35 to 39 years of age from the data. For the
1888 to 1918 cohorts, each distribution is set to that cohort's distribution in 1940 in the data.
Finally, for the 1793 to 1883 cohorts, the distributions are determined as follows. First, assume
that the fraction of males completing high school grew at a constant rate and the fraction of
males completing grammar school fell at a constant rate across the 1793 to 1928 cohorts. Then
compute the trendline using the 1888 to 1928 data. Finally, the fractions completing only high
school and grammar school are found by extending the trendline back to 1793. The cohort-speci¯c
distributions of agents across education groups are summarized in Figure 6.
Market Productivity Pro¯les and Distributions The market productivity pro¯le of an
agent of type s is assumed to be hump-shaped: it reaches its peak height ~ xs when he is age ~ as.
From the agent's expected age of survival, ¹ Ts, to the maximum age that can be achieved, T, the
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Figure 6: Distributions of agents across education groups by cohort under baseline calibration.





ºs(a ¡ ~ as)2 + ~ xs; 0 · a · ¹ Ts;
­se¡½sa; ¹ Ts < a · T:
(4.12)
Note that an agent's pro¯le depends on his cohort-speci¯c life expectancy, ¹ Ts. Figure 4 provides
the sequence of life-expectancies under the baseline calibration.
Determining the market productivity pro¯les and the distributions of agents of each education
type across initial productivity levels requires setting, for each education group e, the means and
standard deviations of the lognormal distributions over initial productivity levels, ¹e and ¾e, and,
for each type s, the pro¯le parameters ~ as, ~ xs, ºs, ­s, and ½s. These parameters are determined
simultaneously such that the model matches a set of statistics computed from data. The data
used is cross-sectional data on the labor earnings of year-round, full-time male workers in 1975
by years of education from the U.S. Census.16 Of course, the pro¯les computed from the data
are a proxy for productivity conditional on working. To mitigate the e®ect of this discrepancy,
16 The speci¯c source is U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 105 "Money
Income in 1975 of Families and Persons in the United States," U.S. Government Printing O±ce, Washington,
D.C., 1977. Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007) also use cross-sectional earnings data for full-time
workers by education group as proxies for education-speci¯c productivity pro¯les. The average pro¯le is similar
to that estimated by Hansen (1993) and commonly used in the literature.
23Table 3: Earnings statistics from U.S Census data targeted to calibrate baseline market produc-
tivity pro¯les and initial productivity distributions.
Education group (e)





ce coe±cient of variation of earnings 0.65 0.67 0.74
fe
fraction of way through
0.54 0.58 0.65
life of peak earnings
pe peak earnings relative to initial 1.76 1.79 2.54
the target statistics are based on the earnings of men aged 25 to 55. Pro¯les are not constructed
for each individual cohort because data on earnings by age and education level is unavailable for
earlier years.
The statistics computed from the data and matched by the model are: (i) mean earnings
of 45 to 49 year-old males with 9 to 12 years of education (high school) relative to those with
8 or less (grammar school), denoted ¹ EH; (ii) mean earnings of 45 to 49 year-old males with
13 or more years of education (college) relative to those with 8 or less, denoted ¹ EC; (iii) the
average coe±cient of variation of earnings over the life-cycle by education group, denoted ce; (iv)
the fraction of the way through expected adult life at which earnings peak by education group,
denoted fe; and (v) the ratio of peak earnings to initial earnings by education group, denoted pe.
Table 3 shows the target values. Notice that, on average, the earnings of individuals with more
education peak later in their life and reach a higher level relative to their initial earnings.
Given these statistics from the data, the parameters are determined as follows. Mean initial
log productivity of the grammar school group is normalized to one. The means for the high school
and college groups and the standard deviations of initial log productivity are chosen such that the
mean (across agents and generations) productivity of agents at age 47 in the high school (college)
group relative to the grammar school group is equal to ¹ EH ( ¹ EC), and for each education group e,
the average (over the life-cycle and across generations) coe±cient of variation of productivity is
equal to ce. The fraction of the way through adult-life at which productivity peaks is assumed to
be constant across agents of the same education level regardless of the generation to which they
24belong. Thus, for each education group e, ~ as is given by
~ as = fe ¹ Ts:
The ratio of peak earnings to initial earnings is assumed to be constant across agents of the same
education level. However, since earlier generations work fewer years before their productivity
peaks, the ratio is not assumed to be constant across generations. Instead, the pe's are only used
to determine the ratios for the youngest cohort in the economy, the 1968 cohort. For each type





and ºs is set such that
xs(0) = x0:
For each agent born before 1968 of type ^ s, º^ s is set such that
x0
^ s(0) = x0
s(0);
where types ^ s and s have the same education and initial productivity level and ~ x^ s is set such that
x^ s(0) = x0:
In other words, agents with the same education and initial productivity level are assumed to have
the same initial slope. This assumption together with the restriction that initial productivity
must be given by x0 pins down ºs and ~ xs for all the cohorts born before 1968. Finally for each
type s agent, ­s and ½s are calculated by forcing the productivity pro¯les to be smooth and
continuous at ¹ Ts, i.e., such that
ºs(¹ Ts ¡ ~ as)2 + ~ xs = ­se¡½s ¹ Ts;
and
2ºs(¹ Ts ¡ ~ as) = ¡½s­se¡½s ¹ Ts:
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80 age 20
Figure 7: Sixty-year productivity and earnings pro¯les of agents from the 1903 and 1943 cohort
with the ¯fth highest initial productivity levels within their education group. Peak productivity
and peak earnings of the 1903 grammar school agent are normalized to 1.
The left-hand panel of Figure 7 shows the productivity pro¯les of agents from the 1903 and 1943
cohort with the ¯fth highest initial productivity level within each education group. Multiplying
the productivity pro¯les by wages and hours gives the agents' earnings pro¯les which are shown
in the right-hand panel. Note that, due to wage growth, earnings peak later than productivity.
Also, note that the pro¯les of agents in higher education groups are steeper.
Additional Parameters Five additional parameters that were determined directly from the
data are summarized in Table 4. The rate of time preference, µ is set such that the average value
of µ + ´ equals 0:02, or in other words, the average annual discount factor is 0:98. The annual
growth rate of wages of 1:5 percent is for the period 1830 to 2000. It was determined using the
real wage index of Williamson (1995) for the period 1830 to 1988 and BLS data for the period
1988 to 2000. Similarly, the rate at which the price of leisure goods falls is estimated from the
leisure price series presented in Figure 3. The 4.1 percent annual interest rate is an after-tax rate
and is taken from McGrattan and Prescott (2000). The fraction of time spent working is set to
46 percent. This is the average time spent working of males in the United States over the period
1830 to 2000.17
17 Data on weekly hours worked by U.S. males is from Whaples (1990) and the Statistical Abstracts of the United
States.
26Table 4: Parameter values under baseline calibration determined directly from data.
Set
µ Rate of time preference 0:007
· Growth rate of wages 0:015
° Rate of price decline 0:006





The rest of the parameters are chosen such that the model matches the data along eight moments.
The ¯rst six moments are the retirement rates of the six cohorts alive in the year 2000.18 The
empirical retirement rates were computed using data from the 2000 HRS and are reported in
Table 5. The year 2000 retirement rates are similar to those shown in Section 2.1 found using
IPUMS data. The seventh moment is the median drop in market consumption. The target is
taken from Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) who ¯nd a median drop for individuals of 5.9 percent
of pre-retirement expenditure. Their estimate of the consumption drop is the ¯rst one based on
observations of total expenditure of individuals before and after retirement. The eighth moment
is leisure goods' share of total expenditure in 2000. The empirical value is set to 11.8 percent
which is the share of total expenditure allocated to leisure goods according to the BLS and
Lebergott (1996) plus 30 percent of transportation's expenditure share. Both the consumption
drop at retirement and leisure goods' share of total expenditure are discussed in more detail in
Section 2.2.
The minimization is done as follows. Assign the numbers 1 through 6 to the six cohorts who
are between the ages of 52 and 77 in the year 2000, respectively. Then de¯ne the following vector
of unknown parameters:
± = (^ c;®;³;Â;¾;¹z;¾z;pg;1793):
Given ±, the model's prediction for the labor force participation rate of cohort i is denoted by
18 The retirement rate is de¯ned in Section 2. The retirement rates for the six cohorts were computed following
the same procedure used to construct the retirement rates series in Figure 2.
27Table 5: Moments: Model and Data.
Cohort Year when Age 20 Age in 2000
% Retired in 2000
Data Model
1 1941-45 75-79 82.9 83.5
2 1945-50 70-74 75.6 76.6
3 1951-55 65-69 63.9 65.4
4 1956-60 60-64 38.4 43.9
5 1961-65 55-59 16.7 12.7
6 1966-70 50-54 7.5 0
Median Consumption Drop 5.9 5.9
Leisure Share 11.8 15.9
Pi(±); the model's prediction for the median drop in market consumption is denoted by D(±);
and the model's prediction for leisure goods' share of total expenditure is denoted by L(±). The
corresponding values in the data are denoted by d, pi, and l, respectively. The exercise now
consists of two steps: First, ± is chosen to minimize the sum of the deviations between the
model's output and the empirical moments. Formally,












Second, the model's predictions, D(^ ±), L(^ ±) and Pi(^ ±), for i = 1;:::;6; are computed using ^ ±.
The results of the minimization are shown in Table 5. Even though there are eight moments
and eight parameters the model is unable to match the moments perfectly. Still, the model is
able to generate the dispersion in retirement rates across age groups observed in the data.
Notice that the model has more di±culty matching the retirement rates of the younger age
groups than the older ones. For example, in the model 43.9 percent of 60 to 64 year-olds are
retired in 2000 compared with 38.4 percent in the data. The overestimation of the retirement
rates of 60 to 64 year-olds by the model may occur because the model does not account for the
impact of Social Security on retirement. As documented in Gustman and Steinmeier (2005), the
hazard rate for retirement spikes at ages 62 and 65 in the U.S. These are the ages at which U.S.
workers ¯rst become eligible for Social Security bene¯ts and can receive bene¯ts without an early
retirement reduction penalty, respectively. The hazard rates suggest that individuals may delay or
28advance their retirement in order to retire at these particular ages. If there are additional bene¯ts
to retiring at ages 62 and 65 not taken into account in the model, the individuals that would most
likely adjust their retirement are those with the smallest cost, i.e., those whose optimal retirement
age without Social Security is close to either age 62 or age 65. While the impact of delaying or
advancing retirement to age 62 on the model's predictions should be small since individuals aged
60 to 64 are lumped together, the impact of the spike at 65 will not be. If some HRS respondents
who, in a world without Social Security, would have chosen to retire at ages close to 65 delayed
their retirement to avoid the early retirement reduction penalty, then retirement rates from the
model would overestimate those observed in the data for the 60 to 64 year-olds.
The model underestimates the retirement rates of the 55 to 59 year-olds and the 50 to 54
year-olds. In particular, in the model no 50 to 54 year-olds are retired, while 7.5 percent of them
are retired in the data. One possible reason for the underestimation is that the model abstracts
from intra-generational heterogeneity in life expectancies. In the data life expectancy is positively
correlated with income. For example De Nardi, French and Jones (2006) ¯nd a 3 year di®erential
in the life expectancies of men in the 20th income percentile compared to men in the 80th at
age 70. If this variation in life expectancies was incorporated into the model it would lower the
retirement age of low productivity types. The model's di±culty in matching the retirement rates
of the younger age groups may also be due to the fact that retirement before age 60 is more likely to
be due to medical conditions that make continuing to work di±cult. In addition, starting in 1950,
workers with medical conditions who retired were eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) bene¯ts. Poor health combined with SSDI may have provided additional incentives to
retire early that are not captured in the model.
The model is able to generate the median consumption drop at retirement observed in the
data. However, leisure goods' share of expenditure in the model (15.9 percent) is larger than the
share targeted in the data (11.8 percent). This may be due to the functional form chosen for
utility. The assumption that momentary utility is a Cobb-Douglas of market consumption net
of subsistence and leisure forces market consumption net of subsistence and non-market time to
have the same degree of complimentarily as market consumption net of subsistence and leisure
good consumption. Relaxing this assumption could improve the model's ability to match this
target however at a cost of additional complexity. On the other hand, 15.8 is not implausible
29Table 6: Parameter values used in baseline model that were chosen to match the model to
moments based on data from the 2000 HRS.
Calibrated in Minimization
^ c Subsistence consumption level 0:042¤
®
Market consumption's share
0:33 of total consumption
»
Weight on leisure goods in
0:073 leisure production function
Â
Determines elasticity of substitution
¡1:72 between leisure goods and leisure time
¾ Determines intertemporal
1:32 elasticity of substitution
¹z
mean of log leisure
0:77 productivity distribution
¾z
Std. dev. of log leisure
1:89 productivity distribution
pg;1793 1793 price of leisure goods 8:75
¤ Relative to mean annual income of 30-34 year-olds in 1963.
when one considers that there are many leisure expenditures which have not been included in
the set of leisure goods given by the BLS. One such example is vacation spending which was 4.2
percent of total expenditure by individuals aged 65 to 74 in 1993.
The values of the parameters that were chosen through the minimization procedure are given
in Table 6. The subsistence consumption level is equivalent to approximately 5 dollars a day in
year 2000. Note that the values for ® and ¾ imply that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for market consumption net of subsistence is 0:81: This value is well within the range suggested
in the literature.19 The baseline calibration is also consistent with the ¯nding of Weagley and
Huh (2004) discussed in Section 2.2.1 as the increase in leisure time that occurs at the moment
of retirement generates an contemporaneous jump in expenditure on leisure goods.
Figure 8 shows the pro¯les of mean and median wealth over the life cycle for each education
group from the 1943 cohort. Consistent with U.S. data the pro¯les are hump-shaped and peak
at the common retirement age of 65. Notice that individuals in higher education groups are
wealthier on average. This is consistent with Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) and Panel
19 For example Attanasio and Weber (1993) ¯nd that the IES of consumption should be in the range from 0:3 to
0:8 based on micro data while values as high as 1 are common in real business cycle literature. See Guvenen
(2006) for an interesting discussion.





































































Figure 8: Life cycle pro¯les of mean and median wealth by education group in the model.
Study of Income Dynamics data as documented by Cagetti (2003). In addition, the mean pro¯le
is above the median illustrating that wealth is skewed across individuals in the same cohort.
Aggregating across education groups, the ratio of the mean to median pro¯le at the point when
the pro¯les peak is 1.4. Fern¶ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2005) ¯nd using cross-sectional data
from the SCF that this ratio is about 4 for U.S household in 1995. Thus there is signi¯cantly
less wealth inequality in the model than in the data. However, this is not surprising given that
the model abstracts from many mechanisms that have been shown to be important drivers of
wealth inequality in the data such as the social security program, means-tested social insurance
programs, and income, medical expense, and survival risk.
4.3 Evolution of Retirement
The model's prediction for the trend in retirement was obtained by running the calibrated model
over the time period from 1793 to 2000. The results are presented in Figure 9. The model predicts
that the retirement rates of the age groups above 60 increased steadily over the 150 years. In the
data the retirement rate of men aged 75 to 79 goes from approximately 22 percent in 1850 to 85
percent in 2000, an increase of 62 percentage points. In the model the rate is 23 percent in 1850
and 84 percent in 2000, an increase of 60 percentage points. Thus the model captures 96 percent
of the increase in retirement of this cohort. By making a similar calculation, the model explains




































Figure 9: Model's prediction for the trend in retirement by age group versus the trends in the
data.
99 percent of the total rise in retirement of the 70 to 74 year-olds, and 87 percent of the total
rise of the 65 to 69 year-olds.
Although the model is able to generate a large share of the overall increase in retirement of
men 65 and over for the 1850 to 2000 period, it underestimates the rate in the later years and
overestimates the rate in the early years. In addition, the model is unable to generate the leveling
out of retirement occurring from 1980 to 2000. Note that, in the model, the real wage and relative
price of leisure goods change at constant rates. Thus the model is designed to assess the impact
of the long-run trends in wage rates and leisure good prices. The impact of short-run °uctuations
of these prices is not captured.
While the model has a di±cult time matching the observed retirement rate levels of men
aged 55 to 64, it still predicts a large share of the overall rise in their retirement rates over the
1850 to 2000 period. For example, the model overestimates the retirement rate levels of the 60
to 64 year-olds in nearly every period. However the retirement rate increases by 38 percentage
points in the model compared to 36 in the data. The overestimation of the levels may be due, as
mentioned above, to the fact that the model abstracts from Social Security which may cause men
32in this age group to delay retirement until 65. The model also has di±culty capturing the steep
rise in this group's retirement rates after 1970. The steep rise may be driven by an increase in
private pensions plans during this period that is not captured in the model. From their structural
estimation, Anderson, Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) ¯nd that over the 1960 to 1980 period
increases in pensions and Social Security can account for about a quarter of the total increase in
retirement of individuals under age 65.
In the model, changes in life expectancy have a big impact on retirement between ages 55
and 59. The decreasing retirement rates for this age group starting in 1950 are driven by a large
increase in the group's life expectancy. With retirement rates decreasing, in order to match the
retirement rate for this age group in 2000, the model must overestimate the retirement rate for
the preceding years. Despite the model's inability to match the trend, it does predict that the
retirement rate rises from approximately 2 percent in 1850 to 13 percent in 2000 compared with
1 percent and 14 percent in the data, capturing 96 percent of the overall rise.
The model predicts that the retirement rates for 50 to 54 year-olds are zero in all periods,
underestimating the rates in the data. As mentioned above, the model abstracts from negative
health shocks and variations in life expectancy. Both of which may be important in accounting
for retirement before age 55.
4.4 Counterfactuals
In order to better understand how the combination of rising real wages, falling relative prices of
leisure goods, rising education levels, and increases in life expectancy drive the trends of rising
retirement of the six cohorts under the baseline calibration, a series of counterfactual experiments
is conducted. These experiments consist in \shutting-down" one or two of the driving forces at a
time, otherwise maintaining the baseline calibration, and rerunning the 150 year transition.
The growth in wages has two e®ects on retirement. The ¯rst e®ect comes from the fact that
wages are increasing across generations or, in other words, the initial wage of cohorts born at
later dates in time is higher than that of those born earlier. Since Â is negative under the baseline
calibration, by Proposition 2, the increase in the level of wages over time will have a positive e®ect
on retirement. The second e®ect comes from the fact that the wage rate is growing throughout a

































































































































Figure 10: The model's prediction for the retirement rates of men aged 60 to 64 (upper left),
aged 65 to 69 (upper right), aged 70 to 74 (lower left), and aged 75 to 79 (lower right) under
the baseline calibration (lines A), when both the price of leisure goods and agents' initial wages
remain at their 1793 value (lines D), when only the price of leisure goods remains at its 1793
value (lines B), and when only the initial wage remains at its 1793 value (lines C).
cohort's lifetime, impacting the shapes of the earnings pro¯les of members of the cohort. Changes
in the shape of an agent's earnings pro¯le change the amount of labor earnings the agent loses by
retiring at any particular moment, or the marginal cost of retiring, thus altering his retirement
date. To isolate the two e®ects, in the ¯rst set of counterfactual experiments, only agents' initial
wage level will be kept ¯xed at its 1793 value. Wages will still increase over the agents' lifetimes
so that the shape of the agents' earnings pro¯les will remain as in the baseline. This way only
the impact of the rise in wages across generations is shut-down.
The results of the ¯rst three counterfactual experiments for the retirement rates of the four
older age groups are summarized by the four panels in Figure 10. The lines labeled A show
the retirement rates of each of these four groups under the baseline calibration. Lines labeled
D show the retirement rates in an economy where both the rise in agents' initial wage and the
34fall in the price of leisure goods since 1793 are \shut-down", or kept at their 1793 value. With
both agents' initial wage and the price of leisure goods ¯xed at their 1793 value the only forces
impacting retirement over time are the changes in the agents' survival pro¯les, income pro¯les due
to changes in life expectancy, and education levels. Notice that for all four age groups, retirement
rates decrease instead of increase over time in this economy. The direct e®ect of increasing an
agent's life expectancy is an increase in his retirement age. In order to pay for the expected extra
years of consumption, it is optimal for the agent to increase his lifetime income by retiring later.
But changing an agent's life expectancy also changes the age of at which he reaches peak market
productivity and the maximum height of his productivity pro¯le. This has two e®ects on the
agent's retirement decision. On one hand, since his market productivity peaks at a later age,
it rises to a higher level, making him wealthier at a younger age and, given that Â is negative,
more likely to retire earlier. On the other hand, the higher peak means the agent's productivity
at the moment he used to retire is now higher and therefore the marginal cost of retiring at this
moment, in terms of forgone earnings, has gone up. The net e®ect of the increase in survival rates
is a reduction in retirement. The increase in the fraction of individuals in the higher education
groups generates a slight increase in retirement. Switching an agent into a higher education
group, holding his relative position within the group constant, increases his initial productivity
level. Again, with Â negative, this will increase the bene¯t from retiring earlier. However, the
switch also increases the age at which his productivity peaks and the level it obtains relative to his
initial productivity. This will increase the cost of retiring. The net e®ect of the rise in education
is a slight increase in retirement. Finally, the total e®ect of the increases in life expectancy and
education over the period is to decrease retirement rates over time.
The lines labeled B show the retirement rates in an economy where only the falling price of
leisure goods is \shut-down". When the price of leisure goods stays at its 1793 value, the fraction
of each cohort that is retired is signi¯cantly lower than in the baseline. The agents can no longer
a®ord to purchase as many leisure goods as before and since leisure goods are compliments with
leisure time, this reduces the marginal bene¯t of retiring. The lines labeled C show the retirement
rates for the case where only agents' initial wage is kept ¯xed at its 1793 value. Since Â negative
generates a dominant income e®ect, when real wages do not increase, the percentage of individuals
retired in each period is lower.
35Without the fall in the price of leisure goods and the rise in wages, the model predicts that
the percent of 60 to 64 year-olds that would be retired in 2000 would be 1 percent compared with
44 percent in the baseline, a di®erence of 43 percentage points. How much of that di®erence is
due to the rise in real wages and how much is due to the fall in the price of leisure goods? If
only wages had risen and the price of leisure goods had remained unchanged, then the fraction
retired in 2000 would have been 25 percent. Hence the rise in wages alone accounts for 55 percent
of the di®erence. Similarly, since the retirement rate of 60 to 64 year-olds in 2000 would have
been 3 percent if only the price of leisure goods had fallen, it alone accounts for 6 percent of the
di®erence. The rest of the di®erence, approximately 39 percent, is due to the interaction of rising
real wages and falling prices of leisure goods. For 65 to 69 year-olds, wages alone can generate
64 percent of the increase in retirement in 2000 from that observed in an economy with only
changes in life expectancy and education and that under the baseline. The fall in the price of
leisure goods can generate 13 percent of the rise alone leaving approximately 23 percent due to
the interaction of the two forces. For 70 to 74 year-olds, the contribution of rising wages alone
is 69 percent and of falling leisure good prices alone is 21 percent with 10 percent due to the
interaction of the two. For 75 to 79 year-olds rising wages alone contribute 74 percent and falling
leisure prices alone contribute 24 percent.
5 Relation to Literature
The most commonly mentioned hypothesis of the increase in retirement in the U.S. is that it was
due to the development and growth of Social Security programs and pension plans. However,
evidence based on empirical studies is mixed and while many studies ¯nd a signi¯cant impact of
such programs on retirement behavior they conclude that other factors driving retirement must
exist. For example Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1994) ¯nd that while changes in pension plans
have a signi¯cant e®ect on retirement, Social Security has only a modest e®ect. Krueger and
Pischke (1992) use data from the Current Population Survey to estimate the e®ect of Social
Security wealth on the labor supply of older US males. They ¯nd that growth in Social Security
bene¯ts can explain less than one sixth of the decline in male labor force participation rates
during the 1970's. Anderson et al. (1999) simulate a structural model of retirement and ¯nd
36that increases in pensions and Social Security can account for about a quarter of the total trend
towards earlier retirement observed from 1960 to 1980 but had no e®ect on retirement by those
above age 65. Finally, Lee (1998) ¯nds, looking at an earlier time period, that the development
of two public welfare programs (Union Army Pensions and Old Age Assistance) cannot explain
much of the rise in retirement prior to 1940 and are at most of secondary importance in driving
the rise.
Costa (1998) is the ¯rst to argue that rising wages along with a fall in the cost of leisure
goods and activities and an increase in their variety has been an important driver of the rise
in retirement. Her comprehensive study contains empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis.
However, the notion that the price of leisure goods has a signi¯cant impact on the demand for
leisure time was ¯rst pointed out by Owen (1971). Owen argues that a signi¯cant amount, about
25 percent, of the decline in weekly hours of U.S. males during the period 1901 to 1961 is due to
the falling relative price of recreation goods. He argues that the other 75 percent of the decline is
due to rises in the real hourly wage. More recently, Vandenbroucke (2009) calibrates a model in
which agents produce and derive utility from leisure. Vandenbroucke ¯nds that the decline in the
price of leisure goods during the ¯rst half of the twentieth century can explain a signi¯cant, albeit
smaller, part of the decline in weekly hours per worker. Also in a recent empirical study, Gonz¶ alez
Chapela (2007) ¯nds that males adjust hours along the intensive margin in response to changing
prices of leisure goods. Speci¯cally, he ¯nds that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of
market time with respect to the price of leisure goods is approximately 0.16 and statistically
di®erent from zero.
This work is the ¯rst attempt to account for the long-run rise in retirement using a quantitative
macroeconomic approach. Consistent with Costa (1998), rising wages and falling prices of leisure
goods are found to be important drivers of the increase in male retirement since 1850. The ¯nding
that changes in leisure good prices are a signi¯cant determinant of labor force participation along
the extensive margin is also consistent with Vandenbroucke's and Gonzalez-Chapela's ¯ndings
that changing leisure good prices impact labor supply decisions on the intensive margin.
376 Conclusion
In order to assess the ability of rising real wages and declining prices of leisure goods to drive a
decrease in labor force participation rates of elderly US males a model economy in which agents
choose the moment of their retirement is developed. Agents in the economy produce leisure
by combining leisure time with leisure goods. Under the baseline calibration, complimentarily
between leisure time and leisure goods along with a dominant income e®ect result in the observed
increase in real wages and fall in the price of leisure goods driving a long-run trend of rising
retirement.
The baseline calibration is obtained using data from the HRS by minimizing the distance
between the model and data along eight moments: the retirement rates of six age groups and the
median drop in consumption and leisure goods' expenditure share in 2000. The calibrated model
is then used to recreate the evolution of the retirement rates of the six groups over the period
1850 to 2000 by plugging in the growth rates of wages and leisure good prices as well as cohort-
speci¯c survival functions, life expectancies, and distributions across education groups from the
data. The model is able to explain more than 87 percent of the rise in retirement for men above
65 since 1850. The model also suggests that these factors had a large impact on the increase in
retirement of men between 55 and 64 years of age. A series of counterfactual experiments reveals
that the rise in real wages is the dominant factor driving the rise in retirement in the model
economy. However, the fall in the price of leisure goods is a signi¯cant force as well.
An important direction of future research is to explore the impact that incorporating addi-
tional factors into the model might have. For example, the model abstracts from social security,
pensions, and social insurance programs such as medicare and medicaid. These programs may
have also played a role in the rise in retirement and it would be interesting to access how adding
them to the model would change the quantitative results. Also, in the current framework it is
assumed that individuals can not adjust labor supply on the intensive margin nor invest in their
human capital. However these decisions may also be a®ected by changes in relative prices. Thus
adding them to the baseline model could have important consequences for the model's prediction
of retirement rates.
387 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2. First note that when ¾ = 1, utility is separable between
market consumption and leisure. Thus there is no jump in market consumption at the moment
of retirement. Totally di®erentiating the ¯rst-order conditions, equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7),
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where ¡ is as above.
When Â = 0, utility is separable in leisure goods and leisure time. Thus there is no jump at
A in leisure good consumption and ­ = 1. It is now trivial to see that dg(a)=dpg;¿ = ¡g(a)=w¿,
dc(a)=dpg;¿ = 0, dg(a)=dw¿ = g(a)=w¿ and dc(a)=dw¿ = [c(a) ¡ ^ c]=w¿ for all a. Consequently
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Notice that the left-hand side (LHS) is decreasing in gA and the right-hand side (RHS) is de-
creasing in g
A. Also notice that, since z > 0 and 0 < ¹ h < 1, when gA = g
A the LHS is greater
than the RHS when Â > 0 and less than the RHS when Â < 0. Therefore for the equality to hold
gA must be greater than g
A when Â is positive and less than g
A when Â is negative. In addition
when Â > 0 it must be that
³g
Â
A + (1 ¡ ³)[z(1 ¡ ¹ h)]Â < ³gÂ
A + (1 ¡ ³)zÂ;






















40is always positive. Hence ¡ > 0 for all Â < 1. Now notice that when Â is positive ­ > 1 and
¤(a) > 1 for all a. Thus, for all a, dg(a)=dpg;¿ < ¡g(a)=pg;¿, dc(a)=dpg;¿ < 0; dg(a)=dw¿ >
g(a)=w¿ and dc(a)=dw¿ > [c(a) ¡ ^ c]=w¿: As a result dA=dpg;¿ < 0. The sign of dA=dw¿ depends
on ^ c. Notice that if ^ c = 0 then dA=dw¿ > 0: Similarly, when Â is negative ­ < 1 and 0 < ¤(a) < 1
for all a. Therefore, for all a, dg(a)=dpg;¿ > ¡g(a)=w¿; c(a)=dpg;¿ > 0; dg(a)=dw¿ < g(a)=w¿ and
dc(a)=dw¿ < [c(a) ¡ ^ c]=w¿ · c(a)=w¿: It follows that dA=pg;¿ > 0 and dA=dw¿ < 0.



























and ¤(a) and ¡ are as in the proof of Propositions 1 and 2. Totally di®erentiating the budget





















In the proof of Propositions 1 and 2 it is shown that ¤(a) > 0 for all a and ¡ > 0. Notice that
if Â = 0 then nA = nA and £ = 0. Now it is easy to see that if Â = 0 then dg(a)=dz = 0;













In the proof of Proposition 1 and 2 it is shown that when Â is positive g
A < gA and hence £ < 0.
It follows that, for all a, dg(a)=dz < 0 and dc(a)=dz < 0. As a result dA=dz < 0. It is also
shown in the preceding proof that when Â is negative g
A > gA. Hence £ > 0 and, for all a,
41dg(a)=dz > 0, dc(a)=dz > 0 and therefore dA=dz > 0.
Numerical Algorithm For each type s the agent's maximization problem is solved as follows.
Given initial guesses for g(0), g
A and A, market consumption at birth and retirement, c(0) and cA,
and the multiplier, ¸, are computed using equations (3.5) and (3.6). Then gA and cA are found
by solving the initial value problem (IVP) characterized by equation (3.11) with g(0) given. The
IVP's are solved using ¯fth and sixth order Runge-Kutta methods. Next the ¯rst-order condition
for A, equation (3.7), and the ¯rst-order condition for g(0), equation (3.6), are computed. Finally
the budget constraint, equation (3.4), is computed using Gaussian quadrature and the Runge-
Kutta methods. This procedure is iterated upon according to a variation of Newton's method until
the equations converge to within the desired tolerance. At this stage, the second order conditions
are checked. In the case where a maximizer is not found, the corner solution is checked, then
a grid search over A is begun to ¯nd a region where the second order condition holds. At each
point in the A grid, equation (3.6) when age is 0 and the budget constraint are used to solve
for g(0) and g
A using the Newton's method-based algorithm. Once a region which bounds the
maximizer is found, the secant method is used to compute A to the desired level of accuracy.
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